Introduction
Research on the finance-growth nexus has expanded rapidly over the past two decades, reflecting both advances in econometric methodology and increased data availability. While early studies tended to focus on growth regressions (King and Levine, 1993) , the field now boasts a complete agenda that includes assessment of causal linkages between financial development and economic growth.
Causality may be assessed on a country-by-country basis or estimation with a panel time series. The first approach has been a staple of finance-growth research since the seminal study of Demetriades and Hussein (1996) . While later panel cointegration and causality tests (e.g. Pedroni, 2004; Hurlin and Dumitrescu, 2012) have raised interest in the panel estimation approach, its peculiar flaw of masking country-specific effects remain a cause for concern. Indeed, masking effects may explain the conflicting results that arise when countryby-country and panel analyses are performed on the same samples (Bloch and Tang, 2003) .
As a result, researchers now tend to prefer extensive application of time-series to panel data methods in assessing finance-growth causal linkages (e.g. Luintel et al., 2008; Arestis et al., 2010 ).
This work considers causality between credit depth (measured as the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP) and economic growth for 24 OECD countries on country-bycountry basis for the period 1980-2013. The sample economies have impressive financial depth. The average private-credit-to-GDP ratio for OECD countries was twice as high as for developing economies, even in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (Cihák et al., 2012 ).
Yet, even if developed economies significantly contributed to a new wave of global financial deepening commencing around 1980 (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , a causal linkage with economic growth is not apparent. Indeed, given the mounting evidence that the financegrowth nexus has weakened worldwide since the 1980s (e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Valickova et al., 2014) , this area appears to warrant better understanding.
This study contributes to the literature on causality between finance and growth in three ways. First, it applies unit root tests to account for possible nonlinearity and structural breaks in data. Unit root tests allow determination of the order of variable integration with reasonable precision, thereby ensuring an accurate realization of the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) 5
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Second, based on the VAR models for individual OECD countries, a Breitung-Candelon test (Breitung and Candelon, 2006 ) is applied to test for causality between credit depth and economic growth in the frequency domain. This test disentangles short-and long-run causal linkages, as well as captures causal clustering not observable in the conventional time domain.
Third, a fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) method is used to uncover possible cointegrating relationships. While this procedure is asymptotically equivalent to the Johansen (1988) cointegration test, it is better suited for short time series. These cointegrating relationships constitute a prerequisite for the causality that I subsequently test for in an error-correction model framework. The technique also distinguishes between short-and long-run causality.
Using this threefold methodological approach, I confirm that causal linkages between credit depth and economic growth are not widespread among OECD economies. For 12 of 24 countries in the sample the three tests yield uniform results in terms of causality presence (absence) and direction. Causality is found to run from credit depth to economic growth for the UK, Australia, Switzerland, and Greece. There is, however, little evidence of causality running the other way, i.e. from growth to credit depth. Thus, my findings lend no support to Patrick's (1966) assertion that financial development in advanced economies begins to adjust to changes in the aggregate demand, switching from a supply-leading pattern to a demand-following form. There is also no discernible evidence of causal links for major economies such as the US, Japan, Germany, or France.
Overall, these results comport with the current discussions on "too much finance"
and disintermediation effects. The first effect is crucial for explaining the few causal linkages for OECD countries in Europe. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these economies appear to have become more bank-based in recent years. Some may have even crossed the "overbanked" threshold, beyond which credit is unlikely to have any causal link with growth. The disintermediation effect accounts for no (or inconsistent) causalities in the cases of the US, Mexico, and Chile. However, country-specific determinants, e.g. for Japan, appear significant. From a policymaking perspective, these findings strongly argue against reliance on bank-based financial development as a sole driver of economic growth. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews recent literature on financegrowth causality in developed countries. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the major findings. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
A number of comprehensive surveys of research on the finance-growth nexus have recently appeared. 1 Stolbov (2013) discusses the origins of this branch of research. Panizza (2013) ferrets out the methodological challenges and puzzles of modern finance-growth studies, while Pasali (2013) presents the full spectrum of issues related to financial development.
Notable among surveys with narrower agendas is the paper of Nyasha and Odhiambo (2014) , which focuses on causal relationships between bank-based financial development and economic growth. These reviews generally pool cross-country, panel data, and time-series studies. Moreover, most lack distinct sections on causal linkages in developing and developed countries.
I confine my overview here to recent research on causality between financial development and economic growth in OECD countries. 2 I include both country-by-country and single-country studies in a time-series framework, but ignore panel and cross-country studies, because, as noted, their findings are not directly comparable with time-series studies.
An extensive search of bibliographic databases yields just twelve articles matching my search criteria, suggesting a significant gap still exists in country-level research on causality between financial development and growth in advanced economies. Five of these papers are cross-country studies, while the other seven are single-country analyses.
1 Earlier influential surveys include Levine (2005) and Ang (2008) . Summarizing the literature up to the early 2000s, they identify the channels through which financial development facilitates growth. Levine (2005) notably focuses on specific functions such as producing ex ante information on investments and capital allocation, exerting corporate governance after providing finance, facilitating risk management, mobilizing savings and easing the exchange of goods and services. When these functions are performed well, Levine argues, it increases the likelihood that financial development can be a robust predictor of future economic activity. Given that Granger causality hinges around the notion of predictability, it legitimizes the assessment of causal links between finance and growth. Overall, the empirical literature is quite heterogeneous and highly sensitive to the design of financial development indicators, observation periods, and econometric methods applied. Therefore, a more consistent (and presumably more nuanced) approach is needed to assess causal linkages between bank-based financial development and economic growth in OECD countries. I propose such an analytical framework below. (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro, 1997) . They are also intertwined with financial development.
As for gross domestic savings to GDP ratio, the literature remains largely inconclusive as to whether financial development fosters or undermines saving. On one hand, there is empirical evidence suggesting that increased access to finance has a negative impact on saving rates in the OECD countries (Hüfner and Koske, 2010) . On the other, there are studies uncovering a hump-shaped link between financial development and saving. In line with this view, financial development initially spurs the latter by providing more saving instruments to households and firms, but eventually curbs incentives for precautionary savings. As a result, overall saving rates shrink (Wang et al., 2011) .
Beck ( (2011), who use the variables as controls one by one, this paper simultaneously includes SAV and TRADE into the econometric analysis.
Methodology 3.2.1 Baseline causal analysis
My baseline approach is to implement Granger causality tests based on VAR models fitted for each country in the sample. To ensure the correct specification of the models, time series are examined for stationarity. Most studies on the finance-growth nexus still rely on first generation Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. The ADF and PP have low power against I(0) alternatives that are close to I(1), because globally stationary time series with a structural break(s) or other forms of nonlinearity may erroneously be found nonstationary with these tests. Hence, they may result in unreliable VAR specifications and computational exercises derived from them (Granger causality testing, impulse-response analysis, variance decompositions).
The paper introduces a recursive strategy of unit root testing that is summarized below in Figure 1 .
Figure 1
Unit root testing scheme for VAR models.
First, a Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman, or BDS, test (Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman, and LeBaron, 1996) is applied to examine all the series for signs of nonlinearity. If this test indicates that a series is nonlinear, then it is subject to Kapetanios-Shin-Snell, or KSS, test (Kapetanios, Shin, and Snell, 2003) , which has the null of a unit root process against an alternative of a nonlinear, but globally stationary, process. The KSS test reportedly has more power than first generation unit root tests and has been extensively used in empirical research. 4 If the null of the KSS test cannot be rejected, such series are additionally tested with ADF and KPSS tests as well as by means of the Bai-Perron (1998 applied. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1997) tests account for a single break, whereas the Clemente-Montañez-Reyes (1998) procedure allows for two breaks. 5 Like most standard unit root tests, their null is that a series has a unit root in the presence of one or more structural breaks. The chain of tests depicted in the right part of Figure 1 is the same.
The starting point, however, is the presence of a unit root in a linear process captured by the ADF and KPSS tests.
Learning integration order I(k) of each variable allows to set up VAR(p) models on country-by-country basis. All four variables (CRED, GDP, SAV, TRADE) enter the models endogenously. The general set up of a VAR(p) model can be written as:
where t y is a vector of jointly determined variables, µ is a vector of constants, i A is a matrix of coefficients to be estimated, and t ε is a vector of error terms.
Assuming that there may be I(0), I(1), and I(2) series for the same country, a feasible approach to VAR estimation is the procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) .
It ensures the validity of Granger causality test when some of the data are nonstationary. The
Toda-Yamamoto approach requires that the VAR(p) model be set up in levels, regardless of the orders of integration of the time series. An appropriate lag length for the variables in the VAR model is then determined based on information criteria. The Bayesian Schwartz Information Criteria (BSIC) is used as a benchmark here.
The model is also examined for overall stability and no serial correlation in the residuals. If the maximum order of integration of the variables is m, then the preferred VAR model should be extended to include these m additional lags. For example, if the maximum order of integration is I(k)=2 and the optimal model is VAR(2), the specification that ensures the validity of Granger causality test will be VAR(4). It is important to note that the test should be based on the initial number of lags, i.e. p=2, while the additional lagged variables are necessary to fix up the asymptotics. These lagged variables enter the augmented VAR model exogenously.
5 EViews 8 is used to perform the Zivot-Andrews and Perron tests; the CMR procedure is carried out in STATA 13. Technical details of the tests are omitted for brevity. Test output is available from the author upon request. (2d) 7 The tests of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Breitung (2002) assume a common unit root process. The test of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) , as well as ADF-Fisher and PP-Fisher tests, imply individual unit root processes. An overall judgment on the presence of group unit root is based on the summary of these test statistics. 8 CRED can equally be a dependent variable and GDP set as a predictor as the cointegrating relations are bidirectional.
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In equations (2a-d), the RESID variable represents residuals obtained from the FMOLS cointegrating regressions accounting for a long-run relationship between CRED and GDP.
The error-correction mechanisms also include first-differenced lags of the four variables under consideration, reflecting short-run dynamics. Evidence of Granger causality between domestic private credit to GDP and real GDP per capita growth rate is a joint Wald test on the 
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Results and discussion
VAR and frequency domain Granger causality
The multi-step strategy for unit root testing has uncovered the following patterns in the integration properties of the variables (Figure 2 ). Appendix Table A1 contains a detailed output of the unit root tests. The knowledge of the orders of integration enables to specify VAR models in conformity with the Toda-Yamamoto approach. Table 1 reports optimal lag length in the VAR models and summary statistics on Granger causality tests in the time and frequency domains.
The VAR Granger causality tests indicate that causal relationships between credit depth and economic growth were generally not widespread for the sample OECD countries in 1980-2013. 9 In those few cases where they are found, causality predominantly runs from credit depth to economic growth. However, only in the case of Switzerland does this linkage hold at the 1 % significance level. For Germany and the Netherlands, credit depth Grangercauses growth at the 5 % significance level, while for the UK, Greece, Australia, and Chile the linkage is significant at 10 %. Iceland is the only economy to show a reverse causal direction running from growth to credit depth.
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Causality between credit depth and economic growth: Evidence from 24 OECD countries In summary, the Breitung-Candelon test largely replicates the main finding of the VAR Granger causality test, with the number of causal relationships remaining quite moderate. 10 The differences that arise between the two approaches are particularly important at long time horizons, emphasizing the need to explore the causal effects further in a cointegrating framework.
Causality in the FMOLS-based approach
FMOLS cointegrating equations are estimated in line with the methodology described in Section 3.2.3. They are presented in Table 2 .
The results show cointegration between CRED and GDP for 12 economies. The ADF test confirms the stationarity of the cointegrating equation residuals, confirming that the equations are correctly specified and the residuals obtained from them can be used to infer about causal effects.
10 Unlike the VAR Granger causality test, the SAV and TRADE variables cannot be endogenized for the Breitung-Candelon test. They are considered genuine conditioning variables, which explains the differences in the results of the two tests. For 16 of 24 countries, however, they coincide in the sense of causality presence and direction.
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Causality between credit depth and economic growth: Evidence from 24 OECD countries than levels. Although examining whether there is a positive or negative causal link between credit depth and growth is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that, among the significant cointegrating relationships, CRED is positively associated with GDP only for Switzerland.
Causality testing in the FMOLS-based approach yields the results shown in Table 3 . Notes: * -significant at the 10 % level; ** -at 5 %; *** -at 1%.
CRED strongly Granger-causes GDP in nine of the 12 countries where cointegrating relationships are found. There is almost no evidence of causality running in the opposite direction. The causal effects exhibit higher significance under this methodology. Long-run causality prevails over short-run causality, with two notable exceptions: the UK and Switzerland. Statistically significant short-run causality underlies the overall effect in these countries. Both forms of causality are found for Australia.
Discussion
The results of the three causality tests have much in common. Each indicates the presence of causality in about half of the sample countries. The direction of observed causality is mainly from credit depth to GDP growth. Moreover, causality tends to hold in the long run.
The tests yield uniform results with respect to the presence (absence) of causality and direction for 12 OECD economies. Its presence is confirmed for the UK, Switzerland, Australia, Iceland. The causal direction based on the same pair of tests is reverse for the Netherlands.
In the case of Chile, the link running from credit to growth is found by the VAR Granger and FMOLS-based tests, while, according to the test in the frequency domain, it is bidirectional. The results are ambiguous for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, and Israel.
These findings conflict with the assertion of Patrick (1966) that the supply-leading pattern gives way to a demand-following pattern as economic development advances. Here, the evidence suggests a supply-leading pattern still prevails in OECD countries. That is, in those few countries where robust causal links are found, credit depth Granger-causes economic growth, not vice versa. My overall findings, however, should discourage policymakers from relying on bank-based financial development as a stand-alone growth determinant.
The empirical evidence obtained is related to the literature asserting that high financial depth measures do not correlate (or correlate negatively) with economic growth. The "too much finance" view implies a threshold level of financial development, beyond which the link between finance and growth becomes negative or vanishes altogether. Before policymakers figure out that this threshold has been crossed, the dark side of finance such as credit misallocation and increased opaqueness of financial institutions comes to the fore. Arcand et al. (2012) put the threshold in the range of 80-100 % of domestic private credit relative to GDP. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) find the threshold to be 90 % of the same ratio for a sample of 50 advanced and developing countries. Based on the panel of 87 countries, Law and Singh (2014) provide another estimate also within the Arcand et al range (94 %). report a somewhat higher threshold (109 %), which they calculate from a sample of more than 100 economies. The non-monotonic link between finance and growth is also found in sector-level studies (Manganelli and Popov, 2013) . In the same vein, Ductor and Grechyna (2015) suggest that financial development may have a detrimental impact on real sector growth if the financial sector deepens too rapidly compared to real sector growth rates. Thus, the "too much finance" literature highlights the importance of maintaining an "optimal" level of financial development. This evidence may serve a tentative explanation for the relatively small number of causal linkages between credit depth and growth in the OECD countries in general. It appears that the mechanics of these causal links may to a certain extent follow a pattern described by Bezemer and Grydaki (2014) . They investigate the credit-output growth relationship for the US during the Great Moderation The findings of the paper can also be placed into the context of the literature that examines causality between financial structure and growth. Unlike Peia and Roszbach (2014) , I assess causal relationships between credit depth and growth, omitting the potential impact of stock market development for data availability reasons. 11 There is little controversy between them regarding the limited presence of causality directed from credit depth to growth. However, in a sharp contrast to Peia and Roszbach (2014) , this paper finds only negligible evidence for the causality running from growth to credit depth.
Recent studies generally support the view that market-oriented financial systems tend to produce a stronger effect on economic growth than their bank-based counterparts (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2013; Yeh et al., 2013) . Thus, the disintermediation of finance can also offer an explanation for the scant evidence of causality between credit depth and growth.
As regards the sample under investigation, the trend has been particularly pronounced in the US, Mexico, and Chile. Using the relationship of stock market capitalization to domestic private credit (SMCAP/CRED) as a proxy for financial structure, these non-European OECD economies are clearly market-based. The proxy indicator has exceeded 1 for all three countries since early 2000 (Figure 4 ). My estimations show they have either no (US and Mexico) or inconsistent (Chile) evidence for causality between credit depth and economic growth. The disintermediation view does not rule out the possibility that a stronger impact exerted by stock markets can entail increased output growth volatility . That said, the causal relationship between stock market development and economic growth should not be taken for granted either.
Interestingly, despite the worldwide trend toward disintermediation, the financial structures of the sample countries have tended to become more bank-based in recent years ( Figure 5 ). Stock market capitalization growth outpaced credit depth dynamics throughout the 1990s and the financial structure became market-based. Since then, there has been a substantial reversal. The gap between the ratios of domestic private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP has yawned in the aftermath of the Great Recession. European countries in the sample drove the change. On average, they were more bank-based in 2012 than in 1988, with stock market capitalization equal to only 43 % of domestic private credit. If causal linkages between credit depth and economic growth in the UK and Switzerland can persist because of financial center specialization, this outcome is hardly possible for EU economies without such status. Their capacity to absorb credit in a productive way is limited. Beyond some point, credit saturation emerges, resulting in credit booms (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece) or capital outflows that may mitigate the severity of a domestic banking crisis (Germany, France, and Austria) but still threaten overall stability, being primarily directed to the overheated EU economies. In addition to offering explanations of general applicability, it is important to recognize country-specific issues. For example, the absence of causality between credit depth and growth in Japan may stem from the persistently negative real interest rates that have suppressed the finance-growth nexus since the 1990s (Chang and Huang, 2010) . More country-level case studies are needed to complement this cross-country analysis of causality between credit depth and economic growth.
Conclusions
This paper assesses causality between domestic private credit to GDP ratio and real GDP per capita growth in a country-by-country time-series framework for 24 OECD economies over 1980-2013. My threefold methodology to test for causal linkages integrates (i) lagaugmented (LA-VAR) Granger causality tests, (ii) Breitung-Candelon causality tests in the frequency domain, and (iii) testing for causal inference with a FMOLS approach. It is also emphasized that nonlinearities and structural breaks in data needed to be taken into account to determine the order of integration of the variables and accurately specify the underlying VAR models. A recursive unit root testing procedure is proposed to seek this goal.
The three tests confirm that the causal linkages between credit depth and growth in the OECD economies are not widespread. In total, testing on 12 of our 24 sample countries yielded identical results in terms of the presence (absence) of causality and direction. Of the 12 countries, stable causal linkages running from credit depth to growth were found for the UK, Australia, Switzerland, and Greece. The causal linkages are important at both high and low frequencies. However, there is little evidence of reverse causal effects, i.e. stable causal linkages running from growth to credit depth. Thus, these findings contrast with Patrick's (1966) assertion that more advanced economies switch from a supply-leading pattern of financial development to the demand-following modality when changes in output begin to lead finance.
These results are consistent with previous studies on the finance-growth nexus in developed countries. Conceptually, they comport with the "too much finance" view, which suggests there may be a threshold separating benign and detrimental effects of financial de- Notes: "NL" denotes nonlinear; "L" -linear; "NS" -nonstationary; "S" -stationary.
